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Abstract
We study a framework where agents have to avoid aversive signals.
The agents are given only partial information, in the form of features that
are projections of task states. Additionally, the agents have to cope with
non-determinism, defined as unpredictability on the way that actions are
executed. The goal of each agent is to define its behavior based on feature-
action pairs that reliably avoid aversive signals. We study a learning
algorithm, called A-learning, that exhibits fixpoint convergence, where
the belief of the allowed feature-action pairs eventually becomes fixed.
A-learning is parameter-free and easy to implement.
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1 Introduction
The main aim of this paper is to let agents solve tasks by ultimately avoiding
aversive signals forever. This approach entails an interesting and perhaps quite
∗T.J. Ameloot is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO).
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Figure 1.1: Tasks contain aversive signals that should be
avoided. In general, we allow multiple start states.
strong guarantee on the agent performance. The motivation is partly to un-
derstand how animals are successful in solving problems, like navigation (Geva-
Sagiv et al., 2015), with limited sensory information and unpredictable effects
in the environment. The animal should find food or return home before it gets
lost or becomes exhausted.
We study a general framework in which agents need to avoid problems in
tasks. If the agent encounters a problem, an aversive signal is received. This way
the agent could learn to avoid the problem, by avoiding the usage of actions and
action-sequences that lead to aversive signals. The general idea is sketched in
Figure 1.1. Before we discuss our approach, we first briefly discuss two important
ingredients of the framework, namely, partial information and non-determinism.
Partial information and non-determinism First, we assume that the
agent is given only partial information, as follows: each encountered task state is
projected to a set of features. This is a propositional representation, where each
feature is a true/false question posed about the state (van Otterlo, 2009). The
number of features determines the granularity by which states can be perceived
by agents. Therefore, the behavior of the agent will be based on feature-action
associations, and not on (direct) state-action associations.1 Each application
can choose its own features and its own way of computing them. Examples
of features are: detected edges in images, impulses through sensors, temporal
events over streams, AND-OR combinations thereof, etc. In this paper, we as-
sume that tasks have only a finite number of features, although there could still
be many features. Perhaps not surprisingly, theoretical investigations show how
hard it is to solve tasks under partial information, see e.g. (Lusena et al., 2001;
Roy et al., 2005; Chatterjee and Chmel´ık, 2015).2
Second, we allow tasks to be non-deterministic. This means that the effect
of some action-applications to states can not be predicted. In this paper, we
assume that non-determinism is an inherent property of tasks. Although partial
information also limits the reasoning within the agent, and therefore generally
prevents accurate predictions, it remains a separate assumption to allow tasks
themselves to be non-deterministic. For example, one may consider tasks in
1If the same feature is used by several states, this may be seen as a form of generalization
over those states. In this paper, features are used directly, and we do not perform a (second)
generalization step over the observed features.
2Part of the motivation for this paper is also to reason about the feature design for solving
tasks. An example is given in Section 5.
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which features actually provide complete information, and where the agent could
still struggle with non-determinism.3
Strategies The focus of this paper to understand agents based on their be-
havior in tasks, which could be a useful way to understand intelligence in gen-
eral (Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999). As remarked earlier, in this paper, agent be-
havior will be based on feature-action associations. Conceptually, we may think
of the agent as having a set P of possibly allowed feature-action pairs, and
whenever the agent encounters a task state s, the agent (thinks it) is allowed
to perform all actions a for which there is a feature f observed in state s such
that (f, a) ∈ P . We also refer to P as a policy.
We say that a set P of feature-action pairs constitutes a strategy for a start
state if P will never lead to an aversive signal when starting from that start
state. We note that it is not always sufficient for the states near the aversive
signals to steer away from them, because sometimes the agent may get trapped
in a zone of the state space that does not immediately give aversive signals but
from which it is impossible to reliably escape the aversive signals. The agent
should avoid such zones, which could require that the agent anticipates aversive
signals from very early on.
Our aim in this paper is to reason about the existence of such successful
strategies for classes of tasks, and to discuss an algorithm to find such strategies
automatically. A main challenge throughout this study is posed by the com-
pression of state information into features and the uncontrollable outcomes due
to non-determinism.
Reward-based value estimation seems unsuitable Before presenting more
details of our algorithm, we first argue that algorithms based on (numerical)
reward-based value estimation do not always appear suitable for reliably find-
ing problem-avoiding strategies.
On the theory side, convergence proofs of value estimation algorithms often
require the learning step-size to decrease over time, see e.g. (Jaakkola et al., 1994;
Watkins and Dayan, 1992). Intuitively, convergence of the estimated values
arises because the decreasing learning step-size makes it harder and harder for
the agent to learn as time progresses. However, we would like to avoid putting
such limits on the agent, because: (1) it is useful to also study more flexible
agents because they might sometimes better describe real-world agents; (2)
in practice it might be difficult to estimate in what exact way the learning
step-size should decrease; and, (3) also in practice, there are no guarantees on
what the estimated values will eventually be after a certain amount of time has
passed, because the estimates depend strongly on random fluctuations during
task performance (due to non-determinism).
In practice, a non-decreasing step-size, although potentially useful to model
flexible agents that keep learning from their latest experiences (Sutton and
Barto, 1998), can lead to problems of its own. We illustrate this with the
example task shown in Figure 1.2a. There is a start state 1, and two actions
a and b that lead back to state 1. We assume complete information for now,
i.e., state 1 is presented completely to the agent as a feature with the same
information, namely, the identity of state 1. Suppose that the state-action pair
3We will see an example of this situation a bit later in the Introduction.
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(a) Example task, with state 1, and ac-
tions a and b. Feedback to the agent is
modeled as numerical reward.
1
a
b
(b) The same task as in Figure 1.2a,
but now feedback is modeled as
(boolean) aversive signals. Applying
action b results in an aversive signal,
indicated by a box with double border.
Figure 1.2: An example task, represented in two ways. States
and action applications are represented by circles and boxes re-
spectively. Start states are indicated by an arrow without origin.
(1, a) always gives reward +1. But for the pair (1, b), the reward could be
either +5 or −10. Although the pair (1, b) is clearly preferable over the pair
(1, a) in case of positive reward, there is the risk of incurring a strong negative
reward. The negative reward represents an aversive signal. In the perspective
of strategies from above, note that (1, a) constitutes a strategy: constantly
executing action a in state 1 leads to an avoidance of aversive signals forever.
But the agent will not necessarily learn to avoid (1, b) when a hidden task
mechanism could periodically deceive the agent by issuing higher rewards under
action b. Concretely, let n be a strictly positive natural number. To represent
the outcome of action b, suppose that we constantly give reward +5 during the
first n times (1, b) is applied; the next n times we give −10; the following n
times we again give +5, and so on. We call this the n-swap semantics. For each
outcome, the empirical probability would be 0.5: indeed, the observed frequency
of each outcome converges to 0.5 as we perform more applications of action b.
We can choose n arbitrarily large; this does not change the empirical probability
of each outcome.
Without the restriction on learning step-size, it seems that value estimation
algorithms can get into trouble on the above setting because we can set n so large
that after a while the agent starts to believe that the outcome would remain
fixed. For example, we could start with reward +5 for the pair (1, b) during
the first n applications, and the agent starts believing that the reward really is
+5. Then come the next n applications, where we repeatedly give reward −10,
and the agent starts believing that the reward really is −10. We can swap the
two outcomes forever, each for a period of n applications, and the agent will
never make up its mind about the behavior of action b in state 1. This effect is
illustrated in Figure 1.3.
Although the above example is very simple, real-world tasks could still ex-
hibit problems similar to the n-swap semantics. Even if such problems are
identified and understood, perhaps there are no good solutions for them as the
problems might be outside the range of control for the agent. In this paper
we would like to learn to avoid the aversive signals forever, even under quite
adversary semantics of tasks like the n-swap semantics.
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(a) Q-values for pair (1, a).
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(b) Q-values for pair (1, b).
Figure 1.3: We have simulated the Q-learning algo-
rithm (Watkins, 1989; Watkins and Dayan, 1992) on the ex-
ample task shown in Figure 1.2a, by alternating actions a and
b, but with constant step-size α = 0.25 (and discounting factor
γ = 0.5). The resulting value estimates for the state-action pairs
(1, a) and (1, b) are plotted against time. The outcome of (1, b)
was either +5 or −10, as determined by the n-swap semantics
where n = 800; this semantics is relative to the applications of
b, and not relative to the global time steps.
Avoidance learning In the example of Figure 1.2a, we would like the agent
to make up its mind more quickly that action b leads to aversive signals. An
idea is to let the agent (monotonically) increase its estimate of the value of a
feature-action pair. We should immediately observe, however, that this idea will
not work when feedback remains to be modeled as reward, as in the example:
once the outcome of (1, b) is observed to be +5; then remembering +5 would
lead to a preference of (1, b) over (1, a), causing a reward-seeking agent to (ac-
cidentally) encounter negative rewards, i.e., aversive signals, indefinitely under
n-swap semantics.
Fortunately, the idea of increasing estimates seems to work when feedback is
modeled with aversive signals, even in face of non-determinism. Indeed, Heger
(1994) has previously proposed a learning algorithm in tasks where actions have
numeric costs, representing aversive signals. By repeatedly remembering the
highest observed cost for a state-action pair (with the max-operator), and by
choosing actions to minimize such costs, the agent learns to steer away from
high costs. We would like to further elaborate this idea and how it relates to
the notion of aversion-avoiding strategies mentioned above.
In our framework, we only explicitly model aversive signals, as boolean flags:
the flag “true” would mean that an aversive signal is present. This leads to a
framework that is conceptually neat and computationally efficient. Because a
policy is either successful in avoiding aversive signals forever, or it is not, the
choice of a boolean model aligns well with our motivation to study the relation-
ship between learning and successful strategies. To illustrate, the example of
Figure 1.2a would be represented by Figure 1.2b, where only the aversive signal
is explicitly represented. In general, the boolean flags will act like borders, to
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demarcate undesirable areas in the state space. Reward is now only implicit: by
using a strategy, as mentioned earlier, the agent can stay away from the aversive
signals forever.
In the above setting with explicit aversive signals, we describe an avoid-
ance learning algorithm, called A-learning, in which the agent repeatedly flags
feature-action pairs that lead to aversive signals, or, as an effect thereof, to
states for which all proposed actions are flagged (based on the observed fea-
tures). Intuitively, the flags indicate “danger”. On the example of Figure 1.2b,
A-learning flags (1, b) at the first occurrence of an aversive signal under action b;
and, importantly, the strategy (1, a) is never flagged.4 There is no second chance
for changing the agents mind. This gives one of the strongest convergence no-
tions in learning, namely, fixpoint convergence, where the agent eventually stops
changing its mind about the outcome of actions.
If there really is a strategy, avoidance learning will carve out a subset of
good feature-action pairs from the mass of all feature-action pairs. This way, it
seems that avoidance learning could be useful in making the agent eventually
avoid aversive signals forever. This provides the guaranteed agent performance
we would like to better understand, as remarked at the beginning of the Intro-
duction.
Meaning of optimality In this paper we view an agent as being optimal if
it can (learn to) avoid aversive signals forever. There is no explicit concept of
reward. Depending on the setting, or application, aversive signals can originate
from diverse sources and together they can describe a very detailed image of
what the agent is allowed to do, and what the agent is not allowed to do. One
obtains a rich conceptual setting for reasoning about agent performance.
For example, suppose a robotic agent should learn to move boxes in a store-
house as fast as possible. We could emit an aversive signal when the robot
goes beyond a (reasonable) time limit. Any other constraints, perhaps regard-
ing battery usage, can be combined with the first constraint by adding more
signals.
Outline This paper is organized as follows. We discuss related work in Sec-
tion 2. We introduce fundamental concepts like tasks, and strategies, in Sec-
tion 3. We present and analyze our avoidance learning algorithm in Section 4.
One of our results is that if there is a strategy for a start state then the algo-
rithm will preserve the strategy. This mechanism can be used to materialize
strategies if they exist. To better understand the nature of strategies, we prove
the existence of strategies for a family of grid navigation tasks in Section 5.
2 Related Work
The idea of avoiding aversive signals, or problems in general, is related to safe
reinforcement learning (Garc´ıa and Ferna´ndez, 2015). There, the goal is essen-
tially to perform reinforcement learning, often based on approximation tech-
niques for optimizing numerical reward, with the addition of avoiding certain
4In our description of A-learning (Section 4), the flagged feature-action pairs are removed
from the agent’s memory.
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problematic areas in the task state space. An example could be to train a robot
for navigation tasks but while avoiding damage to the robot as much as possi-
ble. In the current paper, feedback to the agent consists of the aversive signals.
Reward becomes more implicit, as it lies in the avoidance of aversive signals.
Therefore, the viewpoint in this paper is that the agent is called optimal when
it eventually succeeds in avoiding all aversive signals forever; there is no notion
of optimizing reward. The approach is related to a trend identified by Garc´ıa
and Ferna´ndez (2015), namely, the modification of the optimality criterion.
The work by Heger (1994) is closely related to our work. The framework by
Heger (1994) provides feedback to the agent in the form of numerical cost signals,
which, from the perspective of this paper, could be seen as aversive signals.
Similar to our n-swapping example in the Introduction (Figure 1.2a), Heger
(1994) provides other examples to motivate that estimation of expected values
is not suitable for reliably deciding actions. The learning algorithm proposed
by Heger (1994) maps each state-action pair to the worst outcome (or cost),
by means of the max-operator. By remembering the highest incurred cost for a
state-action pair, the agent in some sense learns about “walls” in the state space
that constrain its actions towards lower costs. The avoidance learning algorithm
discussed in this paper (Section 4) is similar in spirit to the one by Heger
(1994). A deviation, however, is that we assume here a boolean interpretation of
aversive signals, which leads to a neat and computationally efficient framework.
We additionally identify the concept of strategies, under which the agent can
avoid aversive signals forever. Our interest lies in understanding such avoidance
strategies and their relationship to the avoidance learning algorithm. Moreover,
we also focus on partial information, by letting the agent only observe features
instead of full states.
3 Fundamental Notions
3.1 Tasks
For a set X, let P(X) denote the powerset of X, i.e., the set of all subsets of
X. A task is a tuple T = (S,B,A, F, δ, ϕ,Ω) where
• S is a nonempty set of states;
• B ⊆ S is a finite subset of start states;5
• A is a nonempty finite set of actions;
• F is a nonempty finite set of features;
• δ : S ×A→ P(S) is the transition function;
• ϕ : S → P(F ) is the feature function; and
• Ω ⊆ S ×A is the set of aversive signals,
where all states s ∈ S are reachable in the sense that there is a sequence
s0, a0, s1, a1, . . . , sn with s0 ∈ B, sn = s, and si ∈ δ(si−1, ai−1) for each
i ∈ {1 .. n}.
5The symbol B stands for “begin”.
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1; f
2; g
a
a
Figure 3.1: The task from Example 3.1. The basic graphical
notation is explained in Figure 1.2. Inside the circles, we write
the state identifier followed by a semicolon and the features of
the state.
The function δ maps each pair (s, a) ∈ S × A to a set of possible successor
states, representing non-determinism. The function ϕ associates a set of features
to each state; an agent interacting with the task can only observe states through
features and can therefore not directly observe states. The meaning of a pair
(s, a) ∈ Ω is that the agent could witness an aversive signal when performing
action a in state s.6
Example 3.1. We define an example task T = (S,B,A, F, δ, ϕ,Ω) as follows:
S = {1, 2}; B = S; A = {a}; F = {f, g}; regarding δ, we define
δ(1, a) = {1},
δ(2, a) = {2};
regarding ϕ, we define
ϕ(1) = {f},
ϕ(2) = {g};
and, we define Ω = {(1, a)}. The task is depicted in Figure 3.1. 
Remark 3.2 (All features, one successor state). Note that the function ϕ maps
each state to a set of features. Similarly, the function δ maps each state-action
pair to a set of successor states. However, an agent interacts with each function
in a different way, as follows. For a state s, we assume that an agent can always
observe all features in ϕ(s) simultaneously. This way, the function ϕ may be
viewed as being deterministic. In contrast, for a state-action pair (s, a), we
select only one successor state from δ(s, a) to proceed with the task.
The function ϕ remains deterministic throughout this paper. The framework
still allows us to consider tasks in which the agent can sometimes observe a
certain feature and sometimes it can not. Thereto we can define richer states,
in which, say, the status of sensors is stored; if a state s says that a sensor is
broken, then ϕ(s) could omit the feature that would otherwise be generated by
the sensor. 
6In a fair task, if the agent would infinitely often perform action a in state s, then the
agent witnesses an aversive signal infinitely often during the application of a at state s, but
this signal could sometimes be omitted. See also Section 4.3.
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Remark 3.3 (Modeling flexibility). Our definition of task resembles that of a
standard Markov decision process (Sutton and Barto, 1998), but we have added
features and aversive signals. There can be many features, actions, and start
states. And we allow an infinite number of states. 
3.2 Strategies
Since the agent may only see features, and not states directly, agent behavior
has to be based on feature-action associations.
Let T = (S,B,A, F, δ, ϕ,Ω) be a task. A policy for T is a total function
pi : F → P(A). We allow features to be mapped to empty sets of actions. If the
task is understood from the context, for a state s ∈ S we define
act(s, pi) =
⋃
f ∈ ϕ(s)
pi(f),
i.e., act(s, pi) is the set of all actions that are proposed by the policy pi based on
the features in s. We say that a state s is blocked in pi if act(s, pi) = ∅, i.e., the
policy does not propose actions for s.
Remark 3.4 (Features as actors). For a state s, we do not view ϕ(s) as an
atomic signature to which actions should be associated. Instead, the definition of
act(s, pi) indicates that each feature in ϕ(s) may independently propose its own
actions, regardless of what is proposed by other features. All proposed actions
are collected into a set, by means of the union-operator.7 Therefore, features
are little actors that become active at appropriate times and that suggest to
the agent what actions are (supposedly) allowed. This viewpoint resembles the
way that an individual neuron (or a small group of neurons) in the brain could
represent a distinct concept and could be individually linked to actions (Potjans
et al., 2011; Fre´maux et al., 2013).8 It is the goal of the learning algorithm
(Section 4) to remove feature-action associations that lead to aversive signals
or, as a result of such removals, to blocked states. 
We now consider the following definition:
Definition 3.5. A policy pi is called a strategy for a start state s0 ∈ B if
1. act(s0, pi) 6= ∅;
2. ∀s ∈ S, ∀a ∈ act(s, pi),
(a) ∀s′ ∈ δ(s, a) we have act(s′, pi) 6= ∅; and,
(b) (s, a) /∈ Ω.

7It would in general not be possible to replace this with an intersection-operator, because
then there might be some unreliable features to which no action can be associated. Under
an intersection-operator, such empty sets will destroy the proposals contributed by reliable
features.
8So, features constitute the agent’s mind, like neurons constitute an organism’s brain.
Likely there are only finitely many neurons, so the assumption of having a finite number of
features and a finite number of actions (or decisions) appears natural.
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In words: a policy is a strategy for a start state s0 if the policy acts upon
s0; and, for any states upon which the policy acts, the reached successor states
can also be acted upon, and the policy never causes aversive signals. Intuitively,
to use a strategy, for each encountered state s we first select some (arbritary)
feature f ∈ ϕ(s) that satisfies pi(f) 6= ∅, and we subsequently select an arbitrary
action a ∈ pi(f).
Remark 3.6 (Global viewpoint). The definition of strategy demands prop-
erties in a global fashion, possibly also for states that would not be explored
when strictly following the strategy. This condition however ensures that learn-
ing algorithms can never have negative experiences when they perform actions
suggested by the strategy; see Section 4.
Suppose pi is a strategy, and let f be a feature with pi(f) 6= ∅. Intuitively,
the definition of strategy says that f is a reliable feature, in the sense that every
time we see it, we may safely perform all actions in pi(f), without the risk of
encountering blocked states and aversive signals. This is related to the Markov
assumption (Sutton and Barto, 1998), because we do not have to remember any
features that were seen during previous time steps, and we may instead choose
actions based on just f by itself. 
Example 3.7. Consider the task from Example 3.1. There is no strategy for
start state 1, but there is a strategy pi for start state 2 defined as: pi(f) = ∅ and
pi(g) = {a}. 
The following property illustrates that strategies are resilient to adding new
features. In practical applications, this means that the addition of new kinds of
features will not destroy previously existing strategies.9
Proposition 3.8. Let T1 = (S1, B1, A1, F1, δ1, ϕ1,Ω1) be a task. Let V be a
set of features that is disjoint from F1. Let T2 = (S2, B2, A2, F2, δ2, ϕ2,Ω2) be
another task that is almost the same as T1 except that F2 = F1 ∪ V and for
each state s the constraint ϕ2(s) ∩ F1 = ϕ1(s) holds.10 Let s0 be a start state,
and suppose that a policy pi : F1 → P(A1) is a strategy for s0 in T1. Then pi is
also a strategy for s0 in T2.
Proof. We show that the conditions of strategy in Definition 3.5 are satisfied for
pi in T2. To better show which task is involved, for a state s and a task index
i ∈ {1, 2}, we write
act i(s, pi) =
⋃
f∈ϕi(s)
pi(f).
When pi is used in T2, we assume pi(f) = ∅ for each f ∈ V . Above we have also
assumed that A1 = A2.
Condition 1 Since pi is a strategy for s0 in T1, we have act1(s0, pi) 6= ∅. This
implies there is some f ∈ ϕ1(s0) with pi(f) 6= ∅. Since ϕ1(s0) ⊆ ϕ2(s0) by
assumption, we obtain act2(s0, pi) 6= ∅.
9For example, in a robotics application, new features could be the result of adding new
sensor types to the robot.
10This means that T2 uses the features of F1 in the same way as T1.
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Condition 2 Let s be a state and assume there is some action a ∈ act2(s, pi).
First we argue that a ∈ act1(s, pi). There must be a feature f ∈ ϕ2(s) with
a ∈ pi(f). But since pi only knows features in F1, we have f ∈ ϕ2(s)∩F1 = ϕ1(s).
Hence, a ∈ act1(s, pi).
We first handle Condition 2a. Let s′ ∈ δ(s, a). Because a ∈ act1(s, pi) and
pi satisfies Condition 2a in T1, we know act1(s
′, pi) 6= ∅. So there is a feature
f ′ ∈ ϕ1(s′) with pi(f ′) 6= ∅. Since ϕ1(s′) ⊆ ϕ2(s′), we know a ∈ act2(s′, pi) 6= ∅,
as desired.
Now we handle Condition 2b. Because a ∈ act1(s, pi) and pi satisfies Condi-
tion 2b in T1, we know (s, a) /∈ Ω1. Since Ω2 = Ω1, we obtain (s, a) /∈ Ω2, as
desired. 
4 Avoidance Learning
We present and study an avoidance learning algorithm, and its relationship to
the concept of strategy introduced in Section 3.2.
4.1 A-learning Algorithm
Algorithm 4.1 is an avoidance learning algorithm. The algorithm describes
how the agent interacts with the task, and how feature-action combinations are
forgotten as the direct or indirect result of aversive signals. Some aspects of
the interaction are not under control of the agent, in particular how a successor
state is chosen by means of function δ, and how features are derived from states
by means of function ϕ. We now provide more discussion of the algorithm.
Henceforth, we will refer to Algorithm 4.1 as A-learning.
The essential product of A-learning is a set P ⊆ F × A that represents the
allowed feature-action pairs; the symbol P stands for “possibilities”. At any
time, the set P uniquely defines a policy pi as follows: for each f ∈ F , we define
pi(f) = {a ∈ A | (f, a) ∈ P}. Regarding notation, for any state s, we write
act(s, P ) to denote the set act(s, pi) of proposed actions, where pi is the unique
policy defined by P .
We now explain the steps of A-learning in more detail.
• Line 1 initializes P with all feature-action pairs. We will gradually remove
pairs if they lead to Ω or to blocked states (that are created by removals
of the first kind).
• Line 2 selects a random start state. The control flow of the algorithm
is redirected here each time we want to restart the task. But we never
re-initialize P .
Task restarts may be requested by A-learning itself (see below), or exter-
nally by the training framework in which A-learning is running.
• Line 3 requests a task restart in case the chosen start state is blocked.
This allows more exploration from the other start states. As we will see
later in Theorem 4.5(1), if no actions remain for a start state then this
start state has no strategy.
• At Line 6, the algorithm enters a learning loop. The loop is only exited
to satisfy task restart requests, at Line 7.
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Algorithm 4.1: Avoidance learning (A-learning)
Data: Task T = (S,B,A, F, δ, ϕ,Ω).
1 P := F ×A;
2 s := choose from B;
3 if act(s, P ) = ∅ then
4 request restart (see below);
5 end
6 while true do
7 if restart requested then
8 go to Line 2;
9 end
10 a := choose from act(s, P );
11 s′ := choose from δ(s, a);
12 if (s, a) ∈ Ω or act(s′, P ) = ∅ then
13 P := P \ (ϕ(s)× {a});
14 request restart;
15 end
16 s := s′;
17 end
• At Line 10, we choose an action a to apply to current state s based on
the set act(s, P ) of still allowed actions. At Line 11, we are subsequently
given a successor state s′, chosen arbitrarily from δ(s, a).
• Next, at Line 12, we check whether we have encountered Ω or if successor
state s′ is blocked. In either case we exclude from P the feature-action
pairs that caused us to apply action a in state s (Line 13), and we restart
the task (Line 14).
• If we do not encounter Ω and state s′ is not blocked, then we proceed with
the while loop (Line 16).
Note that in general there are multiple runs of A-learning on a task, because
of the choice on action selection and the choice on successor state. Each run of
A-learning is infinitely long. Nonetheless, there is always an eventual fixpoint
on the set P because after the initialization we only remove feature-action pairs.
There are only a finite number of possible feature-action pairs, although there
could be many. When the run is clear from the context, we write P ∗ to denote
the fixpoint of P obtained in that run.
For conceptual convenience, we can divide each run of A-learning into tri-
als by using the task restarts as dividers: whenever we execute Line 2, the
previous trial ends and the next trial begins. Each trial is thus a sequence
s0, a0, s1, a1, . . . , sn, where s0 is a start state, sn is the last state of the trial,
and si ∈ δ(si−1, ai−1) for each i ∈ {1 .. n}.11
11We only use explicit task restarts (Line 2) to divide runs into trials, and not the encounter
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Remark 4.1 (No stopping condition). There is no stopping condition in the
algorithm because in general we may not be able to detect when the agent has
explored the task sufficiently to be successful at avoiding aversive signals. 
Remark 4.2 (Greediness). We would like to emphasize that A-learning is al-
ways greedy in avoiding Ω. This is an important deviation from the -greedy
exploration principle (Sutton and Barto, 1998), where at each time step the
agent chooses a random action with small probability  ∈ [0, 1]. We do not
use that mechanism here because otherwise the agent keeps running the risk of
encountering aversive signals (Garc´ıa and Ferna´ndez, 2015). 
Remark 4.3 (Internal task restarts). The reason for requesting a task restart
at Line 14 is that sometimes the agent could become stuck in a zone of the state
space where there are only blocked states or aversive signals. In that case, if we
want the agent to start removing feature-action pairs to prevent future aversive
signals, we should first transport the agent to a zone in the state space without
blocked states and aversive signals. For example, in a robot navigation problem,
the robot could learn to avoid pits, but once it enters a pit it can perhaps not
reliably escape without the help of an external supervisor. 
Remark 4.4 (Memory efficiency). Algorithm 4.1 explicitly stores the allowed
feature-action pairs in a set P . This is an intuitive perspective for the theory
developed in this paper. However, in practice it may sometimes be more efficient
to store the opposite information, namely, the removed feature-action pairs.
This way all allowed feature-action pairs can still be uniquely recovered. Using
the analogy of a planar map, where aversive signals are borders between neutral
zones on the one hand and undesirable zones on the other hand, there could be
a decreased memory usage in storing only the border (i.e., the removed feature-
action pairs) if the borders are simple shapes instead of irregular shapes with
many protrusions. 
4.2 Results
The following theorem helps to understand what A-learning computes.
Theorem 4.5. For all tasks T = (S,B,A, F, δ, ϕ,Ω), for each s0 ∈ B, for each
run of A-learning, where P ∗ denotes the fixpoint,
1. if there is a strategy for s0 then act(s0, P
∗) 6= ∅.
2. if act(s0, P
∗) 6= ∅ then every trial for s0 after the fixpoint avoids blocked
states and Ω.
Proof. We consider the two properties separately.
Property 1 Suppose there is a strategy pi for s0. We show that the feature-
action pairs of pi are preserved in P ∗, so that act(s0, pi) 6= ∅ would imply
act(s0, P
∗) 6= ∅. Towards a contradiction, suppose that A-learning removes
a pair (f, a) from P where a ∈ pi(f); let (f, a) be the first such pair that is re-
moved. The removal has happened as follows: we reach a state s with f ∈ ϕ(s)
of start states. This means that in principle we allow si ∈ B for some or all i ∈ {1 .. n}.
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and we perform a, and either the successor state s′ ∈ δ(s, a) is blocked or we
receive an aversive signal. We discuss each case in turn.
Let P denote the remaining feature-action pairs just before we remove (f, a).
Note that a ∈ pi(f) and f ∈ ϕ(s) together imply a ∈ act(s, pi).
• Suppose that s′ is blocked. Since pi is a strategy, by condition 2a of
Definition 3.5, we have assumed act(s′, pi) 6= ∅. So, there is a feature
f ′ ∈ ϕ(s′) and an action a′ ∈ pi(f ′). Since (f, a) is the first pair of pi that
is removed, we still have (f ′, a′) ∈ P . But then a′ ∈ act(s′, P ), and s′ is
actually not blocked; we have found a contradiction.
• Suppose that an aversive signal was received when applying a to s, which
implies (s, a) ∈ Ω. This immediately contradicts the assumption that pi
satisfies condition 2b of Definition 3.5.
Property 2 Suppose act(s0, P
∗) 6= ∅. Towards a contradiction, suppose that
after the fixpoint there is a trial for start state s0 where we encounter a state
s and we perform an action a such that either the successor state is blocked or
we receive an aversive signal. Suppose we conceptually halt the offending trial
at the first encountered problem. We have followed a path:
s0
a0−→ s1 a1−→ . . . sn−1 an−1−−−→ sn = s an=a−−−→ s′,
for some s′ ∈ δ(s, a). We have ai ∈ act(si, P ∗) for each i ∈ {0 .. n}. We note in
particular that a ∈ act(s, P ∗). Next we distinguish two cases, depending on the
type of problem.
• Suppose that act(s′, P ∗) = ∅. Then A-learning now removes ϕ(s) × {a}
from P . But then we will no longer propose action a for state s, which was
previously allowed by the fixpoint. Then P ∗ would be an invalid fixpoint,
which is a contradiction.
• Suppose that an aversive signal is received when applying a to s, which
implies (s, a) ∈ Ω. We make a similar reasoning as in the previous case:
A-learning removes ϕ(s) × {a} from P . Again P ∗ would be an invalid
fixpoint.

Remark 4.6 (Strategies and eventual success). Suppose that a task has a
strategy for each start state. In that case, Theorem 4.5 tells us that every run
of A-learning will eventually avoid blocked states and aversive signals. The
agent therefore makes a transition from first discovering the strategies to later
exploiting the strategies.
The opposite is not necessarily true: there are tasks for which exist runs
that eventually avoid blocked states and aversive signals, but without there
being a strategy in the sense of Definition 3.5. This is illustrated by the task
in Figure 4.1. Consider a run where the first application of action b in state 1
results in an aversive signal, and after which we immediately restart the task.
In that run, there is no further exploration to state 2, which causes (f, a) ∈ P ∗;
hence, act(1, P ∗) = {a} 6= ∅. However, note that if the internal restart request
at Line 14 of Algorithm 4.1 would sometimes not be handled immediately, but
a few steps later, then some runs will not preserve the pair (f, a). 
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1; f
b
a
2; f a
Figure 4.1: An example task that has no strategy for the start
state 1. But there is a run of A-learning in which the feature-
action pair (f, a) is preserved. The graphical notation is ex-
plained in Figure 3.1.
Remark 4.7 (Usage of A-learning). The insights of Theorem 4.5 could be used
as follows. First, although proving that a strategy exists helps in understanding
guarantees on the agent performance, programming the strategy by hand could
be tedious and time-consuming. So, Property 1 could be used to materialize
strategies once they are proven to exist.
Second, if one does not know whether a strategy exists, Property 2 could
be used to perform a preliminary search for strategies. Although the discovered
strategies might not be easily interpreted, they could serve as inspiration for a
theoretical study of strategies for the tasks at hand. A practical consideration,
however, is that it might not be possible to efficiently detect the fixpoint, i.e.,
typically one does not know if a fixpoint has been reached when A-learning has
not removed feature-action pairs for a while. 
4.3 Fairness
So far we have silently allowed all possible runs of A-learning. For example,
we did not explicitly demand that the agent actually must receive an aversive
signal when applying an action a to a state s where (s, a) ∈ Ω. The aversive
signal could also be omitted. This brings us to the topic of fairness (Francez,
1986).
Intuitively, for this paper, fairness would mean that there is sufficient explo-
ration of the task. A practical application of A-learning (Algorithm 4.1) could
take the following fairness assumptions into account:
• if we execute Line 2 infinitely often then we choose each start state in-
finitely often;
• to fully learn the task from each start state, we infinitely often issue exter-
nal task restarts at Line 7; those restarts are not requested by A-learning
itself;
• at Line 10, if we encounter the same pair of a state s and set P infinitely
often then we choose each action a ∈ act(s, P ) infinitely often;
• at Line 11, if we apply action a infinitely often to state s then each suc-
cessor state s′ ∈ δ(s, a) is visited infinitely often from an application of a
to s;
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• at Line 12, if we perform action a in state s infinitely often, where (s, a) ∈
Ω, then the agent should infinitely often receive an aversive signal when
applying a to s;
The only aspect of fairness that can be directly influenced by the agent itself, is
the action selection at Line 10. For this purpose, a random number generator
can be used to select random indices in an array-representation of the proposed
actions.12
Remark 4.8 (Fairness not required). Note that Theorem 4.5 also works for
unfair runs. Every run has a fixpoint on P , whether the run is fair or not.
But by exploring fewer states, or by issuing fewer aversive signals, an unfair run
essentially makes it easier for the agent to avoid aversive signals. This way, some
feature-action pairs could remain forever, even though a more fair exploration
of the task could have removed them.
Also, because the notion of strategy in Definition 3.5 is rather strong, it is
not possible for a fair run or an unfair run to confront the agent with a situation
that leads to the failure of a strategy. The agent will never be disappointed in
the exploitation of the strategy. 
5 Simple Grid Navigation
We study a simple class of grid navigation problems.
5.1 Definitions
Let Z denote the set of integers. For any two points p1, p2 ∈ Z × Z, denoting
p1 = (x1, y1) and p2 = (x2, y2), we recall the definition of L1-distance between
p1 and p2:
d1(p1, p2) = abs (x2 − x1) + abs (y2 − y1) .
A simple grid navigation problem is a quintuple G = (Width,Height ,Starts,
Targets, τ), where
• Width ∈ N and Height ∈ N are the dimensions of a terrain;
• Starts ⊆ {0 ..Width} × {0 ..Height} is a set of start locations;
• Targets ⊆ {0 ..Width} × {0 ..Height} is a set of possible target locations;
and,
• τ ∈ N is a time limit,
with the following assumptions,
• ∀p, q ∈ Targets, we assume d1(p, q) < τ ; and,
• ∀p ∈ Starts,∀q ∈ Targets, we assume d1(p, q) < τ .
12One has to assume that the random number generator is fair in selecting all indices
infinitely often if we let the system run forever.
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The intuition is that at the beginning of a session we select a start location
p ∈ Starts and an initial active target location q ∈ Targets and we should
navigate from p to q within time τ . Whenever we reach the active target location
q we choose another target location q′ ∈ Targets and we should now navigate
from q to q′ within time τ . This relocation of the active target may be repeated
an arbitrary number of times. But at any moment we may also begin a new
session, in which we again choose a start location and initial target location.
There are infinitely many sessions. The available actions are: left, right, up,
down, left-up, left-down, right-up, right-down, and wait. Importantly: failure
to respect the time τ results in an aversive signal; we aim to eventually avoid
such aversive signals.
For a location (x, y) ∈ N × N and an action a, we now define the possible
successor locations that result from the application of a to (x, y); we denote this
set as move(x, y, a). A set of multiple possible successors is used to represent
non-determinism. An empty set of of successors is used to say that the action
would lead outside the considered terrain. We assume the following actions to
be deterministic: left, right, up, and down. The other, “diagonal”, actions are
non-deterministic. For example, for each (x, y) ∈ Z× Z,
move(x, y, left) = {(x− 1, y)},
move(x, y, left-up) = {(x− 1, y − 1), (x− 1, y), (x, y − 1)},
and,
move(x, y,wait) = {(x, y)}.
We make the assumption that the direction of the positive Y-axis corresponds
to “downward”.
We now define the task structure task(G) = (S,B,A, F, δ, ϕ,Ω) that corre-
sponds to the above grid problem G. Here it will be convenient to view states
and features as structured objects, with components; for an object x with a
component y, we write x.y to access the component.
• the set S consists of all triples s with components agent, target, and time,
satisfying the following constraints: s.agent and s.target are both in the
set {0 ..Width} × {0 ..Height}, and s.time ∈ {0 .. τ};
• the set B consists of those states s where s.agent ∈ Starts, s.target ∈
Targets, and s.time = τ ;
• A = {left, right, up, down, left-up, left-down, right-up, right-down, wait};
• the set F consists of all pairs f with components offset and time, satisfying
the constraints: f .offset ∈ {−Width ..Width} × {−Height ..Height} and
f .time ∈ {0 .. τ};13
• the transition function δ is described by Algorithm 5.1; for a state s ∈ S
and action a ∈ A, the set δ(s, a) consists of all states that could possibly
be returned by Algorithm 5.1 upon receiving input (s, a);
13These features represent an agent-centric perspective, in which the relative offset to the
target is stored (see below).
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• regarding ϕ, for each s ∈ S, we define ϕ(s) = {f} where f ∈ F is the
single feature for which f .offset = s.target− s.agent and f .time = s.time;
and,
• Ω = {(s, a) ∈ S ×A | s.time = 0}.
Algorithm 5.1: Action application for grid navigation (Section 5)
input : (1) current state s ∈ S
(2) action a ∈ A
output: successor state s′ ∈ S
1 (x1, y1) := s.agent;
2 (x2, y2) := choose from move(x1, y1, a);
3 if (x2, y2) ∈ {0 ..Width} × {0 ..Height} then
4 s′.agent := (x2, y2);
5 else
6 s′.agent := (x1, y1);
7 end
8 if s′.agent = s.target then
9 s′.target := choose from Targets;
10 s′.time := τ ;
11 else
12 s′.target := s.target;
13 s′.time := max(0, s.time− 1);
14 end
5.2 Results
Proposition 5.1. For each grid problem G, there is a strategy for each start
state in task(G).
Proof. Denote task(G) = (S,B,A, F, δ, ϕ,Ω). We define one policy that is a
strategy for all start states.
First, we define an auxiliary set V ⊆ F to consist of all features f for which
|f .offset|1 < f .time,
where |(x, y)|1 = abs (x) + abs (y) is the L1-norm of a point (x, y). Intuitively,
such features indicate that the deterministic distance from the agent location
to the target location – where we only use the actions left, right, up, and down
– can be bridged within the remaining time.
We now define a policy pi. For all f ∈ F \ V we define pi(f) = ∅, and for
each f ∈ V , denoting f .offset = (x, y), we define
pi(f) =

{left} if x < 0;
{right} if x > 0;
{up} if x = 0 and y < 0;
{down} if x = 0 and y > 0;
{wait} x = 0 and y = 0.
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As mentioned earlier, we define downwards as the direction of the positive Y-
axis. The case where pi(f) = {wait} occurs when the agent is located at the
target.14
Let s0 ∈ B. We show that pi is a strategy for s0, according to Definition 3.5.
Condition 1 of Definition 3.5 We show that act(s0, pi) 6= ∅. By assumption
on s0, we have s0.agent ∈ Starts, s0.target ∈ Targets, and s0.time = τ . By using
the distance assumptions on locations in G, we obtain d1(s0.agent, s0.target) <
τ . Letting f be the single feature in ϕ(s0), we see that |f .offset|1 < τ = f .time,
which implies that f ∈ V . Hence pi(f) 6= ∅, which implies act(s0, pi) 6= ∅.
Condition 2a of Definition 3.5 Let s ∈ S. Suppose there is some action
a ∈ act(s, pi). Let f denote the single feature of s. We have a ∈ pi(f), which
implies f ∈ V .
Let s′ ∈ δ(s, a). We must show that act(s′, pi) 6= ∅. Let f ′ be the single fea-
ture of s′. We will show that f ′ ∈ V , which implies pi(f ′) 6= ∅, and further that
act(s′, pi) 6= ∅. Based on Algorithm 5.1, we reason about what has happened
during the application of action a to state s.
• Suppose the if-test at Line 8 succeeds, i.e., the agent reaches the target
location. Then s′.time = τ , and
d1(s
′.agent, s′.target) = d1(s.target, s′.target)
< τ,
where we use the distance assumption between target locations. Overall,
|f ′.offset|1 < f ′.time; hence, f ′ ∈ V .
• Suppose the if-test at Line 8 does not succeed, i.e., the agent did not
yet reach the target location. It must be that a 6= wait, because oth-
erwise f .offset = (0, 0), which implies s′.agent = s.agent = s.target,
and the test at Line 8 would have succeeded (see previous case). So,
a ∈ {left, right, up, down}.
First, we observe that
d1(s
′.agent, s′.target) < d1(s.agent, s.target).
Indeed, this property holds because (1) the locations s.agent and s.target =
s′.target are inside the convex terrain; (2) the action a is given determin-
istic movement semantics (i.e., there is precisely one outcome), causing
s′.agent to be both inside the terrain and strictly closer to s.target =
s′.target.
Second, we also observe that
f ′.time = f .time− 1,
since s′.time = max(0, s.time − 1) by definition and s.time > 0 (which
follows from f ∈ V ).
14Algorithm 5.1 implies that the situation where f .offset = (0, 0) only occurs when the
agent reaches some target location and the next target location is the same as the old target
location.
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Overall, we may now write
|f ′.offset|1 < |f .offset|1
≤ f .time− 1
= f ′.time.
In the second line we have used f ∈ V . We conclude that f ′ ∈ V .
Condition 2b of Definition 3.5 Let s ∈ S. Suppose there is some action
a ∈ act(s, pi), which implies that the single feature f of s must be in V . By
definition of V , we have |f .offset|1 < f .time. Hence, s.time > 0, which implies
(s, a) /∈ Ω, as desired. 
Remark 5.2 (Richness in strategy). The policy defined in the proof of Propo-
sition 5.1 is in general not the maximal strategy, in the sense that the policy
could be extended with more actions than currently specified. For instance, if
the time limit is high then the agent can randomly wander around before it
becomes sufficiently urgent to reach a target location. The agent may also use
the diagonal actions, like left-up, if the time limit is not violated under either
of the three outcomes. 
Remark 5.3 (Extendability). It is possible to extend the above setting of grid
navigation to richer state representations, by including for example the locations
of additional objects (that do not influence the agent). If this new information
would be communicated to the agent with a set of features that is disjoint from
the set of old features in Section 5.1, then Proposition 3.8 tells us that the
strategy described in the proof of Proposition 5.1 is still valid. 
6 Conclusion and Further Work
We have used the notion of strategies to reason about the successful avoidance of
aversive signals in tasks. We have shown that our avoidance learning algorithm
always preserves those strategies. Now we discuss some interesting topics for
further work.
Feature detectors In this paper we have considered a framework in which
features are essentially black boxes, in the sense that we do not assume anything
about the way that they are computed. Hence, we do not know how features
are related to the task environment. It would be interesting to develop more
detailed insights into how features can be designed, to ensure that strategies, or
similarly successful policies, are possible.
In particular, it seems fascinating to explore possible connections between
our framework and neuron-like models, where features would be represented
by neurons or by small groups of neurons. It is currently an open question
whether or not feature learning in the brain is a completely unsupervised pro-
cess (Fre´maux and Gerstner, 2015), i.e., it is not known whether feature creation
is influenced by rewarding or aversive signals. So, in a general theory, it might
be valid to consider feature learning as a separate, unsupervised, module. This
approach could lead to a conceptually simple framework of agent behavior and
feature detection simultaneously. Concretely, the approach could enable the
results in this paper to be linked to various feature detector algorithms.
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The challenge of new features In this paper we have assumed that the
set of features is fixed at the beginning of the learning process. This could be
suitable for many applications, as there is no fixed limit on how many features
there are, as long as there are finitely many. But it seems intriguing to introduce
new features while the agent is performing the task. In the technical approach
of this paper, however, a newly inserted feature likely proposes wrong actions if
we would initially associate all actions to the feature. In general we still insist
that aversive signals are avoided, and therefore the wrong actions need to be
unlearned as soon as possible.
A way to soften the introduction of new features, could be to reintroduce
reward into the framework. Concretely, a feature f may only propose an action
a if the pair (f, a) has been observed to be correlated to reward, either directly,
or transitively by means of eligibility traces (Sutton and Barto, 1998). This
idea introduces a threshold for proposing actions. Of course any feature-action
pairs introduced in this way could still lead to aversive signals. For example,
there could be spurious features (e.g. features that randomly appear) to which
no actions should be linked, or perhaps the rewarding signals contradict the
aversive signals, or some actions that give reward could also give aversive signals
(as in the example of the Introduction). To resolve priority issues, one could
view avoidance learning as having the highest precedence, where reward is used
as a softer ranking mechanism on the allowed actions.
Possibly, an agent that keeps learning new features will keep making mis-
takes. How to cope with new features therefore seems a relevant question. The
answers could perhaps also help to understand animal behavior and conscious-
ness. Thereto one could consider other notions of success than the avoidance of
aversive signals investigated in this paper.
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